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[L. A. No. 27754. In Bank. July 1, 1966.]

LAURANCE A. SEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ELIZABETH LEE SEE, Defendant and Appellant.
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[1] Divorce-Findings-Cruelty.-!..The trial court did not err in
finding that a husband's actions constituted extreme cruelty
where the finding was made on consideration of all the circumstances in light of the intelligence, refinement, and delicacy of
sentiment of the complaining party and was supported by
substantial evidence.
[2] Id.-Grounds-Cruelty-Corroboration of Successive Acts.-In
a divorce action, when repeated instances of offensive conduct
are offered to establish cruelty, it is not necessary that each be
corroborated.
[3] Id.-Grounds-Cruelty-Corroboration.-Determination of the
sufficiency of evidence corroborating cruelty is within the trial
court's sound discretion.
•
[4] Id.-Alimony-Where Divorce Granted to Both Parties.-The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to
a wife where both parties were granted a divorce; alimony may
be granted to either party, even though a divorce is granted to
both.
[5] Husband' and Wife-Properly-Community and Separate'l'ime of Acquisition as Test.-The character of property as
separate or community is determined when acquired.
[6] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Properly
by Agreement.-Property that is community when acquired
remains so throughout the marriage unless the spouses agree to
change its nature or the spouse charged with its management
makes a gift of it to the other.
.
[7] Id.-Properly-Determination of Character - Pr:esumptions:
Burden of Proof.-Property acquired by purchase during

[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 41; Am.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 49.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, § 111; [2] Divorce, § 21;
[3] Divorce, § 26(1); [4] Divorce, § 198(1) (f); [5] Husband and
Wife, § 36; [6] Husband and Wife, § 159; [7] Husband and Wife,
§§ 69, 77; [8] Husband and Wife, § 54; [9, 10] Husband and
Wife, § 90(3); [11] Husband and Wife, § 55; Divorce, § 221; [12,
22] Husband and Wife, § 69 (6); [13] Husband and Wife, § 53;
[14] Husband and Wife, §§ 120, 125; [15] Husband and Wife,
§§ 120, 125, 130; [16, 19, 20] Husband and Wife, § 130; [17]
Husband and Wife, § 73; [18] Husband and Wife, §§ 100, 130;
[21] Divorce, § 221.
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marriage is presumed to be community, and the burden is on
the spouse asserting its separate character to overcome the
presumption.
[8] Id.-Property-Commingling.~The presumption that property
acquired by purchase during marriage is community applies
when the husband purchases property during the marriage
with funds from an undisclosed or disputed source, such as an
account or funds in which he has commingled his separate
funds with community funds.
[9] ld.-Property - Determination of Character - EvidenceCommingled Property.-A husband may trace the source of
property to his separate funds and overcome the presumption
that property acquired during marriage is community with evidence that community expenses exceeded community income at
the time of acquisition. Where he proves that, at the time, all
community income was exhausted by family expenses, he establishes the property was purchased with separate funds.
[10] ld.-Property-Character-Evidence-Commingled Property
-Only when, through no fault of the husband, it is not
possible to ascertain the balance of income and expenditures at
the time the property was acquired, can recapitulation of the
total community expenses and income throughout the marriage
be used to establish the character of property acquired during
the marriage. (Disapproving anything to the contrary in Patterson v. Patterson, 242 Cal.App.2d - - [51 Cal.Rptr. 339].)
[11] ld.-Property - Commingling - Tracing Funds: DivorceDisposition of Property-Determination of Character.-A husband who commingles comlllunity with separate property, but
fails to keep adequate records, cannot, at the termination of
the marriage, invoke the burden of record keeping as a justification to recapitulate income and expenses and disregard
acquisitions that may have been made during the marriage
with community funds.
[12] ld.-Property-Character-Presumptions.-When funds used
to acquire property during marriage cannot otherwise be traced
to their source and the husband who commingled property is
unable to establish a deficit in the communitY accounts at the
time of acquisition, the presumption controls that propert.y
acquired by purchase during marriage is community.
[13] ld.-Property-Commingling.-A husband may protect his
separate property by not commingling community and separate
assets and income. Once he commingles, he assumes the burden
of keeping records adequate to establish the balance of
community income and expenditures when an asset is acquired
with commingled property.
[14] ld.·-Liability - For Wife's Support: Wife's LiabilitY.-A
husband and wife assume mutual obligations of support, and
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these obligations are not conditioned on the existence of
community property or income.
[15] ld.-Liability for Wife's Support: Wife's Liability: Reimbursement for Advances.-The duty to support imposed on
husbands by Civ. Code, § 155, and on wives by § 176, requires
the use of their separate property when there is no community
property, and there is no statutory right to reimbursement.
[16] ld.-Liability - Reimbursement for Advances.-A husband
who elects to use his separate property instead of community
property to meet community expenses cannot claim reimbursement.
[17] ld.-Property-Character-Presumption of Gift.-Absent a
contrary agreement, the husband's use of separate property for
community purposes is a gift to the community.
[18] Id.-Proper1y-Management and Control: Liability - Reimbursement for Advances.-A husband has both management
and contrQI of community property (Civ. Code, §§ 172, 172a)
with the right to select the place and mode of living (§ 156),
and his use of separate property to maintain a standard of
living that cannot be maintained with cOllllllunity resources
alone no more entitles him to reimbursement from afteracquired community assets than it would from existing
community assets.
[19] Id. - Liability - Reimbursement for Advances. - A husband
has no right to reimbursement of separate funds expended for
community purposes when the community bank account is
exhausted.
[20] Id.-Liability-Reimbursement for Advances.-A party using
separate property for community purposes is entitled' to reimbursement from the community or separate property of the
other only where there is an agreement between the parties to
that effect. (Disapproving, to the extent of conflict with this
rule, Mears v. Mears, 180 Cal.App.2d 484 [4 Cal.Rptr. 618];
Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128 [274 P.2d 951];
Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal.App.2d 116 [264 P.2d 626];
Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682 [187 P.2d 28].)
[21] Divorce-Disposition of Property-Determination of Character.-A husband's interest in profit-sharing trusts of two
corporations was unquestionably a community asset where his
interest arose by virtue of his employment and was irrevocable
at the time of his divorce.
.
[22] Husband and Wife-Property-Character-Presumptions.In a divorce action, where the property issues were improperly
[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 20; Am.Jur., Husband and Wife (1st ed § 110).
[21] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce aIHl Separation, § 291.
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tried on the theory that the nature of the property could be
determined by proving total community expenditures exceeded
total community income and it was possible the parties might
have additional evidence that would otherwise have been
presented, plaintiff's failure to overcome the presumption that
the assets acquired during marriage were community property
was not conclusive.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frederick W. Mahl, Jr., ,Judge. Reversed
in part and affirmetl in part.
Action· and cross-action for divorce. Judgment granting
divorce to each party reversed as to that portion of jUdgment
determining there was no community.property and awarding
alimony to wife, and in all other respects affirmed.
Crowley & Goffin, Arthur J. Crowley and Ron Swearinger
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Stanley N. Gleis for Defendant and Appellant.

J

TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff Laurance A. See and crosscomplainant Elizabeth Lee See appeal from an interlocutory
judgment that grants each a divorce. Laurance attacks the
finding tl.iat he was guilty of extreme cruelty, the granting of
a divorce to Elizabeth, and the award to her of permanent
alimony of $5,400 per month. Elizabeth attacks the finding
that 'there was no community property at the time of the
divorce. Neither party contests the provisions regarding
custody and support of the three minor children.
The parties were married on October 17, 1941, and they
separated about May 10, 1962. Throughout the marriage they
were residents of California, and Laurance was employed by a
family-controlled corporation, See's Candies, Inc. For most of
that period he also served as president of its wholly-owned
subsidiary, See's Candy Shops, Inc. In the twenty-one years
of the marriage he received more than $1,000,000 in salaries
from the two corporations.
[1] . The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff's
actions constituted extreme cruelty. That finding was made
upon consideration of all the circumstances of the case in light
of the" intelligence, refinement, and delicacy of sentiment of
the complaining party" (Nunes v. Nunes, 62 Ca1.2d 33,36 [41
Cal.Rptr. 5, 396 P.2d 37J) and is supported by substantial
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evidence. [2] When repeated instances of offensive conduct
are offered to establish cruelty, it is not necessary that each be
corroborated. [3] The determination of the sufficiency of
corroborating evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. (Id. (.\t p. 37.)
[4] Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding
alimony to Elizabeth. Alimony may be awarded to either party
even though a divorce is granted to both. (Mueller v. Mueller,
44 Ca1.2d 527, 530 [282 P.2d 869] ; DeBurgh v. DcBurgh, 39
Ca1.2d 858, 874 [250 P.2d 598].) We do not reach plaintiff's
contention that the alimony award was excessive. Since that
part of the judgment must be reversed for reasons that appear
hereafter, the considerations that prompted the amount of the
award may no longer be relevant.
Laurance had a personal account on the books of See's
Candies, Inc:, denominated Account 13. Throughout the
marriage his annual salary from See's Candies, Inc., which
was $60,000 at thc time of the divorce, was credited to this
account and many family expenses were paid by checks drawn
on it. To maintain a credit balance in Account 13, Laurance
from time to time transferred funds to it from an account at
the Security First National Bank, hereafter called the Security Account.
The funds deposited in the Security Account came
primarily from Laurance's separate property. On occasion he
deposited his annual $15,000 salary from See's Candy Shops,
Inc. in that account as a "reserve against taxes" on that
salary. Thus there was a commingling of community property
and separate property in both the Security Account and
Account 13. Funds from the Security Account were sometimes
used to pay community expenses and also to purchase some of
the assets held in Laurance's name at the time of the divorce
proceedings.
Over Elizabeth's objection, the trial court followed a theory
advanced by Laurance that a proven excess of community
expenses over community income during the marriage establishes that there has been no acquisition of property with
community funds.
Such a theory, without support in either statutory or case
law of this state, would disrupt the California community
property system. It would transform a wife's interest in the
community property from a "present, existing and equal
interest" as specified by Civil Code section 161a, into an
inchoate expectancy to be realized only if upon termination of
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the marriage the community income fortuitously exceeded
community expenditures. It would engender uncertainties as
to testamentary and inter vivos dispositions, income, estate
and gift taxation, and claims against property.
[5] The character of property as separate or-community is
determined at the time of its acquisition. (In "e Miller, 31
Cal.2d 191, 197 [187 P.2d 722] ; Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal.
767, 770 [7 P.2d 1003]; Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 42 [145 P.
516]. [6] If it is community property when acquired, it remains so throughout the marriage unless the spouses agree to
change its nature or the spouse charged with its management
makes a gift of it to the other. (Odone v. Marzocchi, 34 Cal.2d
431, 435 [211 P.2d 297, 212 P.2d 233, 17 A.L.R.2d 1109];
Mears v. Mears, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 499 [4 Cal.Rptr. 618].)
[7] Property acquired by purchase during a marriage is
presumed to be community property, and the burden is on the
spouse asserting its separate character to overcome the
presumption. (Estate of NiccoUs, 164 Cal. 368 [129 P. 278] ;
TAomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 123 [264 P.2d
626]. [8] The presumption applies when a husband purchases property during the marriage with funds from an undisclosed or disputed source, such as an account or fund in
which he has commingled his separate funds with community
funds. (Estate of Neilson, 57 Ca1.2d 733,742 [22 Cal.Rptr. 1,
371 P.2d 745]. [9] He may trace the source of the property
to his separate funds and overcome the presumption with
evidence that community expenses exceeded community income at the time of acquisition. If he proves that at that time
all community income was exhausted by family expenses, he
establishes that the property was purchased with separate
funds. (Estate of Neilson, supra, at p. 742; Thomasset v.
Thomasett, supra, at p. 127.) [10] Only when, through no
fault of the husband, it is not possible to ascertain the
balance of income and expenditures at the time property
was acquired, can recapitulation of the total community expenses and income throughout the marriage be used to
establish the character of the property. Thus, in Estate of
Ades, 81 Ca1.App.2d 334 [184 P.2d 1], relied on by plaintift, this method of tracing was used to establish that assets
discovered after the husband's death had been acquired before
. the marriage. The question was not presented as to the balance
of income and expenditures at any specific time during the
marriage. In Estate of Arstein, 56 Ca1.2d 239 [14 Cal.Rptr.
809, 364 P .2d 33], relied on by plaintiff, the husband's skill
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and industry in managing his separate property was the
source of all community income during the marriage. Not until
the trial could a determination be made as to what proportion
of the total income was attributable to the husband's skill and
industry. In Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d
116, the court made clear that the time of acquisition of
disputed property is decisive. " An accountant testified that at
the time the various items adjudged to be defendant's
separate property were purchased, there were no community
funds available. . . . The evidence [shows] . . . that at the
time the property was purchased the community funds had
been exhausted. . . . " (ld. at p. 127.) Anything to the
contrary in Patterson v. Patterson, 242 Cal.App.2d - - [51
Cal.Rptr. 339], is disapproved.
[11] A husband who commingles the property of the community with his separate property, but fails to keep adequate
records cannot invoke the burden of record keeping as a
justification for a recapitulation of income and expenses at the
termination of the marriage that disregards any acquisitions
that may have been made during the marriage with community
funds. [12] If funds used for acquisitions during marriage
cannot otherwise be traced to their source and the husband
who has commIngled property is unable to establish that there
was a deficit in the community accounts when the assets were
purchased, the .presumption controls that property acquired by
purchase during marriage is community property. [13] The
husband may protect his separate property by not commingling
community and separate assets and income. Once he commingles, he assumes the burden of keeping records adequate to
establish the balance of community income and expenditures
at the time an asset is acquired with commingled property.
The trial court also followed the theory that a husband who
expends his separate property for community expenses is
entitled to reimbursement from community assets. This theory
likewise lacks support in the statutory or case law of this
state. A husband is required to support his wife and family.
(Civ. Code, §§ 155, 196, 242). [14] Indeed, husband and
wife assume mutual obligations of support upon marriage.
'rhese obligations are not conditioned on the existence of community property or income. [15] The duty to support imposed upon husbands by Civil Code section 155 and upon
wives by Civil Code section 176 requires the use of separate
property of the parties when there is no community property.
There is no right to reimbursement under the statutes.
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[16] Likewise a husband who elects to use his separate
property instead of community property to meet community
expenses cannot claim reimbursement. [17] In the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, the use of his separate property
by a husband for community purposes is a gift to the community. The considerations that underlie the rule denying
reimbursement to either the community or the husband's separate estate for funds expended to improve a wife's separate
property (Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 589 [296 P. 604, 77
A.L.R. 1015]) apply with equal force here. [18] The husband has both management and control of the community
property (Civ. Code, §§ 172, 172a) along with the right to
select the place and mode of living. (Civ. Code, § 156.) His use
of separate property to maintain a standard of living that cannot be maintained with community resources alone no more
entitles him to reimbursement from after-acquired community
assets than it would from existing community assets.
[19] Nor can we approve the recognition of an exception, a
right to reimbursement of separate funds expended for community purposes at a time when a community bank account is
pxhausted. (Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [274
P.2d 951]; Thomasset v. Thomasett, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d
116, 126; HI?,l v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [187 P.2d 28] ;
cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484,508.) Although
this exception was restricted to recovery from the same
community account when replenished, there is no statutory
basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it. Such an exception conflicts with the longstanding rule that a wife who uses her separate funds in
payment of family expenses without agreement regarding
repayment cannot require her husband to reimburse her. (lves
v. Oonnacher, 162 Cal. 174, 177 [121 P. 394] ; Blackburn v .
.Blackburn, 160 Cal.App.2d 301, 304 [324 P.2d 971] ; Thomson
v. Thomson, 81 Cal.App. 678 [254 P. 644]; cf. Haseltine v.
Haseltine, 203 Cal.App.2d 48 [21 Cal.Rptr. 238].) Nor is a
wife required to reimburse her husband in the converse situation, particularly since the husband has the control and
management of community expenses and resources. [20] The
basic rule is that the party who uses his separate property for
community purposes is entitled to reimbursement from tht'
. community or separate property of the other only if there is
an agreement between the parties to that effect. To the extent
that they conflict with this rule Mears v. Mears, supra, 180
Cal.App.2d 484; Kenney v. Ke'rlney, sztpra, 128 Cal.App.2d
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128; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 CalApp.2d 116; and
Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682 [187 P.2d 28], are disapproved.
Elizabeth makes several additional assignments of error
relative to specific assets in existence on the dissolution of the
marriage but not found to be community property. [21] The
record does not afford a basis for determining the nature of
these assets, with the exception of Laurance's interest in the
profit-sharing trusts of the two See corporations. His interest
in these funds arose by virtue of his employment and was
irrevocable at the time of the divorce. It was therefore unquestionably a community property asset.
Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving an excess of
community expenses over community income at the times the
other assets purchased during the marriage were acquired. The
part of the judgment finding them to be his separate property
is therefore reversed. [22] Since the property issues were
tried on the theory that the nature of the property could be
determined by proving total community income and expenditures and since the parties may have additional evidence that
.Jvould otherwise have been presented, plaintiff's failure to
overcome the presumption that the assets are community property is not conclusive. We therefore remand the case for retrial
of the property issues. Since the court considered the lack of
community property a significant factor in determining the
amount of the alimony award, that part of the judgment is
also reversed.
The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Elizabeth
shall recover her costs on both appeals.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.
.

